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ARGUMENT 
POINT I. MR. MICKELSON SUFFERED FROM AN ACTUAL 
CONFLICT OF INTEREST THAT ADVERSELY AFFECTED 
HIS PERFORMANCE. 
(Replying to State's brief at Point I, pp. 14-31) 
A. WHILE THE STATE SUPERFICIALLY GIVES 
CREDENCE TO THE CORRECT LEGAL STANDARD, 
IT IMPROPERLY APPLIES A MUCH STRICTER 
STANDARD OF PREJUDICE THAN IS ACTUALLY 
REQUIRED. 
The State concedes, as it must, that the correct legal 
standard for reviewing Mr. Mickelson's conflict of interest is as 
set forth in Cuvler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 350, 100 S.Ct. 1708, 
1719, 64 L.Ed.2d 333 (1980), as quoted in the conflict of interest 
portion of Strickland v. Washington, 446 U.S. 668, 692, 104 S.Ct. 
2052, 2067, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984): 
One type of actual ineffectiveness claim 
warrants a similar, though more limited, presumption of 
prejudice. In Cuvler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S., at 345-350, 
100 S.Ct., at 1716-1719, the Court held that prejudice is 
presumed when counsel is burdened by an actual conflict 
of interest. In those circumstances, counsel breaches 
the duty of loyalty, perhaps the most basic of counsel's 
duties. Moreover, it is difficult to measure the precise 
effect on the defense of representation corrupted by 
conflicting interests. Given the obligation of counsel 
to avoid conflicts of interest and the ability of trial 
courts to make early inquiry in certain situations likely 
to give rise to conflicts, see, e.g.. Fed. Rule Crim. 
Proc. 44(c), it is reasonable for the criminal justice 
system to maintain a fairly rigid rule of presumed 
prejudice for conflicts of interest. Even so, the rule 
is not quite the per se rule of prejudice that exists for 
the Sixth Amendment claims mentioned above. Prejudice is 
presumed only if the defendant demonstrates that counsel 
"actively represented conflicting interests" and that "an 
actual conflict of interest adversely affected his 
lawyer's performance. " Cuyler v. Sullivan, supra, 446 
U.S., at 350, 348, 100 S.Ct., at 1719, 1718 (footnote 
omitted). 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 692, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2067, 
80 L.Ed.2d 674, 696-7 (1984) (emphasis added). 
While conceding the above test applies, the State 
essentially argues in terms of an actual showing of prejudice as 
required for a typical ineffective assistance of counsel claim not 
involving a conflict of interest. The actual burden on appellant 
is significantly less onerous. State v. Johnson, 823 P. 2d 484 
(Utah App. 1991) is illustrative. In Johnson, this Court borrowed 
a two part test from United States v. Hobson, 672 F.2d 825 (11th 
Cir.)(per curium), cert, denied, 459 U.S. 906, 103 S.Ct. 208, 74 
L.Ed.2d 166 (1982) to assess whether an attorney's conflict created 
a sufficient appearance of impropriety to require disqualification: 
2 
First, the court must find that there is "at 
least a reasonable possibility that some specifically 
identifiable impropriety" occurred because of the 
representation. Id. (quoting Woods v. Covington County 
Bank, 537 F.2d 804, 813 (5th Cir.1976)) . There need not 
be proof of actual wrongdoing, however. Id. at 829. 
Second, the court must balance "the likelihood of public 
suspicion or obloquy" against the social interest in 
allowing the defendant to continue being represented by 
the lawyer of his or her choice. Hobson, 672 F.2d at 828 
(quoting Woods, 537 F.2d at 813 n. 12) . 
Johnson, 823 P. 2d at 490. No actual impropriety was required; only 
a "reasonable possibility." Compare State v. Brown, 853 P.2d 851 
(Utah 1992) (announcing per se rule of reversal when a criminal 
defendant's appointed counsel has concurrent prosecutorial 
responsibilities, based on the mere possibility that the 
representation would be compromised and on the appearance of 
impropriety). Only a reasonable possibility of a detriment to the 
defendant is required. A concrete showing of prejudice is not 
required, yet the State seeks to impose such a requirement on 
appellant here: 
Example 1: Instead of addressing whether defense counsel 
should have offered Mr. Bredehoft's testimony against the Mickelson 
interests in plea bargaining (adverse effect = not offering 
testimony in exchange for concessions) , the State focuses on 
whether a plea bargain could have been achieved. State's brief at 
Point I.C.I., pp. 23-25. By ignoring the adverse effect, and 
applying the incorrect reasonable prospect of a more favorable 
result prejudice test, the State makes a superficially attractive 
showing that an affirmative showing of prejudice cannot be made. 
3 
However, the State's argument is legally untenable because once the 
adverse effect is shown, prejudice is presumed. 
Example 2: Instead of addressing whether Mr. Mickelson's 
conflict adversely affected the decision to have Mr. Bredehoft 
testify (adverse effect = conflict caused counsel to want to put 
Bredehoft on to testify that he was not intoxicated, so clubs are 
not liable in dramshop suit), the State focuses on whether there 
was an independent tactical reason to have Mr. Bredehoft testify. 
State's brief at Point I.C.2., pp. 25-27. By ignoring the adverse 
effect, and applying the incorrect prejudice test, the State makes 
a superficially attractive showing that the decision to place Mr. 
Bredehoft on the stand was tactical, and thus cannot constitute 
ineffective assistance of counsel. However, the State's argument 
is legally untenable because once the adverse effect is shown, 
prejudice is presumed. 
Example 3: Instead of addressing whether Mr. Mickelson's 
conflict adversely affected the decision to have the bartender from 
Charlie's Club testify (adverse effect = conflict caused counsel to 
not investigate clubs and to want to put bartender on to establish 
clubs did nothing improper), the State focuses on whether there was 
an independent tactical reason to have her testify. State's brief 
at Point I.C.3., p. 28. By ignoring the adverse effect, and 
applying the incorrect prejudice test, the State makes a 
superficially attractive showing that the decision to have the 
bartender testify was tactical, and thus cannot constitute 
ineffective assistance of counsel. However, the State's argument 
4 
is legally untenable because once the adverse effect is shown, 
prejudice is presumed. 
Example 4: Instead of addressing whether trial 
references to Doug Mickelson adversely affected the representation 
by creating the possibility that trial counsel's credibility was 
impugned (adverse effect = possibility that jury discounted Mr. 
Mickelson7s arguments because they thought he was in cahoots with 
Mr. Bredehoft, and the appearance of impropriety), the State 
focuses on whether the references to Doug Mickelson were sufficient 
to establish prejudice under the standard test. By ignoring the 
adverse effect, and applying the incorrect prejudice test, the 
State makes a superficially attractive showing that an affirmative 
showing of prejudice cannot be made and Mr. Bredehoft has not been 
prejudiced. However, the State's argument is legally untenable 
because once the adverse effect is shown, prejudice is presumed. 
Example 5: Instead of addressing only the adverse 
effects alleged by appellant, the State additionally addresses Mr. 
Mickelson's forensic trial performance. State's brief at Point 
I.C.5., pp. 29-30. By ignoring the adverse effects, and applying 
an incorrect standard ineffective assistance of counsel analysis, 
the State makes a superficially attractive showing that Mr. 
Mickelson did not render ineffective assistance in the normal 
sense. However, the State's argument is irrelevant surplusage 
because Mr. Bredehoft is not raising a normal ineffective 
assistance of counsel claim. He is alleging a conflict of 
5 
interest. Once the conflict and an adverse effect are shown, 
prejudice is presumed. 
The reasonable possibility that Mr. Mickelson's decisions 
were affected by his conflict of interest establishes an adverse 
effect, and mandates application of the presumption of prejudice 
here. No concrete showing of prejudice is required. 
B. MR. MICKELSON'S CONFLICT WAS NOT MERELY 
HYPOTHETICAL. 
The State asserts that any conflict between Mr. Bredehoft 
and his counsel was hypothetical. To the contrary, Mr. Mickelson 
and/or his family members and corporations faced civil liability 
both under the dramshop act, Utah Code Ann. § 32A-14-101 (Supp. 
1997), and for punitive damages. Additionally, the Mickelsons and 
their corporations potentially faced criminal liability for the 
service of alcohol to Mr. Bredehoft that resulted in the death of 
Sean Adkins. Utah Code Ann. § 32A-12-103 (1994). 
A conflict existed because of the possibility of 
compensatory and punitive damages against the corporations and Mr. 
Bredehoft in a civil action. Principles of comparative fault are 
implicated, whereby the corporations can seek to avoid punitive 
damages by making Mr. Bredehoft appear to be more responsible.1 
Though the mere prospect of punitive damages against the Mickelsons 
xThe State asserts that under the dramshop act "the fault of 
dramshops and drunk drivers is never compared," State's brief at 
21, but fails to discuss punitive damages at all. In seeking to 
avoid punitive damages against themselves and their interests, the 
Mickelsons' strategy must be to divert blame from themselves to Mr. 
Bredehoft. 
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and their interests establishes that a conflict existed, history 
has borne out the seriousness of the conflict. In fact, in the 
dramshop action brought after trial here punitive damages of 
$500,000 were assessed against Mr. Bredehoft, $250,000 against 
Uncle Bart's, and $100,000 against Charley's Club. The total jury 
award against the Mickelson clubs, as reduced by trial court, was 
$750,000. Exhibit D-9 at p. 9.2 
The State asserts that the interests of Mr. Bredehoft 
were aligned with those of Mr. Mickelson and his family members, 
State's brief at 18, but this is not so. The conflict created a 
desire in Mr. Mickelson, conscious or subconscious, to develop 
favorable evidence for the clubs. Absent the conflict, the 
decision to have Mr. Bredehoft testify might have been made 
differently. Except where self defense must be raised, it is rare 
to have a homicide defendant testify. Here, Mr. Bredehoft's 
testimony was subjected to devastating rebuttal. Trooper Zdunich 
had previously been precluded from testifying concerning the 
effects of alcohol on a person due to the prosecution's failure to 
give advance notice that he would testify as an expert in this 
area, R. 182 7, but as a result of Mr. Bredehoft's testimony opening 
the door, he was permitted to testify concerning, inter alia, the 
effects of various blood alcohol concentration levels on people and 
2The trial court refused to receive this exhibit based on 
relevancy grounds, but included the exhibit in the record for 
purposes of appeal. The actual result of the dramshop action is in 
a sense irrelevant here. The conflict existed no matter what the 
outcome. It was the possibility of a dramshop action naming Mr. 
Bredehoft, Mr. Mickelson, and the other Mickelson interests that 
created the conflict. 
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their ability to drive. See R. 1827-1847. In light of the fact 
that none of the boys present with the disabled Malibu saw a green 
car force Mr. Bredehoft into the emergency lane, this defense was 
unlikely to succeed. Defense counsel could have attempted to 
develop this defense through expert testimony. The decision to 
have Mr. Bredehoft testify was adversely impacted by the conflict. 
Additionally, as set forth in the opening brief at 18-19, 
counsel for Mr. Bredehoft could and should have sought plea 
bargained concessions in exchange for cooperation with the State in 
testifying against the Mickelsons and their clubs and corporations. 
This created a direct conflict where the interests of Mr. Bredehoft 
did not align with those of the Mickelsons and Mickelson 
corporations. Mr. Bredehoft would have to testify that he was 
intoxicated, that bar personnel were aware or should have been 
aware of that fact, and that they continued to serve him alcoholic 
beverages in spite of that fact. To avoid a conviction, the 
Mickelsons would necessarily have to establish that Mr. Bredehoft 
was not "apparently under the influence of intoxicating alcoholic 
beverages" and that it was not the case that they "knew or should 
have known from the circumstances" that he was under the influence 
of intoxicating alcoholic beverages. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 32A-12-
204, 32A-12-103 (1994).3 
The State's argument that there was no criminal exposure 
is unconvincing. Possible criminal exposure for the Mickelson 
3The Mickelsons have effectively dodged this bullet. The two 
year statute of limitations for class B misdemeanors has run. See 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-302(1)(b) (1995). 
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corporations, rather than individuals, is sufficient to create a 
conflict. The State does not argue that the corporations could not 
have faced liability. 
No individual criminal liability is necessary for a 
conflict to exist. However, the record unambiguously shows that 
Mr. Mickelson's father managed the "day-to-day operations of 
Charlies Club." R. 2198. The most reasonable reading of § 32A-12-
103(2) would make him "the officer or agent of the corporation or 
association in charge of the premises in which the offense is 
committed" who "is prima facie considered a party to the offense 
committed, and is personally liable to the penalties prescribed for 
the offense as a principal offender." This court can and must find 
that Doug Mickelson faced prima facie criminal liability for the 
automobile homicide.4 
The State makes much of Mr. Mickelson's self-serving 
testimony that he did not "see any criminal liability here on these 
clubs' parts." R. 2156. It is indeed a novel proposition that a 
criminal defendant, or an officer and owner of a corporate criminal 
defendant, should be the final arbiter of whether there is any 
criminal liability. Mr. Mickelson's apparent blindness to the true 
4Defense counsel failed to elicit that Mrs. Mickelson managed 
the day-to-day operations of Uncle Bart's, and was similarly liable 
for that club's involvement. The only reasonable inference from 
the evidence is that Mrs. Mickelson's role in the other club was as 
something more than a lowly employee, given that the Mickelsons and 
their closely held corporations both owned and managed the club. 
However, counsel's shortcoming in conclusively establishing this 
fact is irrelevant, given Doug Mickelson's clear liability. 
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extent of the conflict only highlights the problem with his 
continued representation of Mr. Bredehoft. 
C. MR. BREDEHOFT'S REPRESENTATION WAS 
ADVERSELY AFFECTED. 
The State relies on State v. Webb, 790 P. 2d 65 (Utah App. 
1990) for the test applicable in the joint representation of 
codefendants. However, the case at bar involves an actual conflict 
between a criminal defendant and his lawyer, rather than a lawyer 
representing codefendants who may or may not have adverse or 
inconsistent defenses. 
Mr. Mickelson's failure to offer Mr. Bredehoft's 
testimony against himself, his family members, and their 
corporations was an adverse affect. No sound tactical reason 
existed for not pursuing this option. Conflict-free counsel would 
have pursued this avenue of plea bargaining. The State argues that 
even if such a plea had been pursued it would have been rejected by 
the prosecutor, but this is both highly speculative and irrelevant. 
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 [A] defendant who shows that a conflict of interest actually 
.affected the adequacy of his representation need not demonstrate 
prejudice in order to obtain relief." Cuvler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 
335, 349-50, 100 S.Ct. 1708, 1719, 64 L.Ed.2d 333 (1980). Whether 
or not such an offer would have been accepted, a fact which we can 
never know,5 makes no difference.6 Where a conflict of interest 
5|IAnd to assess the impact of a conflict of interests on the 
attorney's options, tactics, and decisions in plea negotiations 
would be virtually impossible. Thus, an inquiry into a claim of 
harmless error here would require, unlike most cases, unguided 
10 
exists, only an adverse effect need be shown. As set forth in 
Point I.A., supra at 1, the State is attempting to engraft the 
"reasonable likelihood of a better result" standard of typical 
ineffective assistance of counsel claims into the conflict of 
interest analysis, something which Strickland and Sullivan 
expressly prohibit. 
The State discusses at length Mr. Mickelson's forensic 
performance at trial, State's brief at 29-30, but this after-the-
fact second guessing is of precisely the type disavowed by the 
Supreme Court in Holloway: 
In the normal case where a harmless-error rule is 
applied, the error occurs at trial and its scope is 
readily identifiable. Accordingly, the reviewing court 
can undertake with some confidence its relatively narrow 
task of assessing the likelihood that the error 
materially affected the deliberations of the jury. 
Compare Chapman v. California, supra, at 24-26, 87 S.Ct., 
at 828-829, with Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 
108, 94 S.Ct. 2887, 2902, 41 L.Ed.2d 590 (1974), and 
United States v. Valle-Valdez, 554 F.2d 911, 914-917 (CA9 
1977) . But in a case of joint representation of 
conflicting interests the evil--it bears repeating--is in 
what the advocate finds himself compelled to refrain from 
doing, not only at trial but also as to possible pretrial 
plea negotiations and in the sentencing process. 
speculation." Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 491, 98 S.Ct. 
1173, 1182, 55 L.Ed.2d 426 (1978). 
6Though irrelevant, the State's observation that "experienced 
prosecutors would never reduce a second degree felony charge 
against the actual perpetrator of the homicide in exchange for his 
testimony against the dramshops or their owners," State's brief at 
24, is wide of the mark. Mr. Bredehoft could have bargained for 
something short of reduction of the second degree felony charge, 
such as dismissal of the three class B misdemeanor charges to which 
he pled guilty. Thus, he may have avoided the consecutive sentence 
imposed for those charges, see R. 300-307, and the State could 
still have had its second degree felony conviction. 
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Holloway, 435 U.S. at 490, 98 S.Ct. at 1182. The focus here must 
be on Mr. Mickelson's continued representation in the face of a 
conflict, his failure to inform the trial court of the conflict, 
and the adverse effects the conflict had on the representation. 
Prejudice is presumed, and additional examples of forensically 
sound representation cannot affect the existence of the conflict 
and its overarching effect on the total representation, or overrule 
the presumed prejudice rule of Cuvler v. Sullivan. Mr. Bredehoft 
is entitled to a reversal. 
POINT 11. THE STATE WAS REQUIRED TO SHOW THE 
UNAVAILABILITY OF A TELEPHONIC SEARCH WARRANT. 
(Replying to State's brief at Point II, pp. 32-44) 
A. CASES CITED BY APPELLANT ARE ON POINT AND 
CONTROLLING. 
The State attempts to distinguish the authority relied 
upon by appellant in his opening brief at 3 5 by observing that 
"These cases differ from the case at bar in critical ways: none 
involves a blood test, an intoxicated driver, or a homicide; none 
discusses Schmerber; and all rely on rule 41(c) (2), Federal Rules 
of Criminal Procedure." State's brief at 37 n.14. None of these 
insignificant distinctions makes any difference. 
First, Rule 41(c) (2)7 is merely the federal counterpart 
to Utah Code Ann. § 77-23-204(2), allowing for telephonic warrants. 
The State cites no reason why federal courts addressing federal 
cases arising in the districts of Colorado (Cuaron, controlling 
7This rule is set forth verbatim in the addendum. 
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Tenth Circuit precedent), Arizona (Tarazon), D.C. (McEachin), 
Western District of Washington (Manfredi), Central District of 
Illinois (Talkinaton), and Western District of Texas (Berick) 
should cite to Utah Code Ann. § 77-23-204(2) as authority for 
federal officers to obtain telephonic warrants rather than the 
federal authority in Rule 41(c) (2) .8 
That the fourth amendment applies to searches in myriad 
factual situations is hardly novel. Given that blood draws are 
only involved in drunk driving enforcement, it is not surprising 
that these federal cases arising outside the drunk driving context 
do not involve blood tests of intoxicated drivers. For the same 
reason, there is no reason why these cases would discuss Schmerber 
v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 86 S. Ct. 1826, 16 L.Ed. 2d 908 (1966). 
Nonetheless, the fourth amendment is applicable to blood draws. 
Skinner v. Rv. Labor Executives7 Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 616, 109 
S.Ct. 1402, 1412, 103 L.Ed.2d 639 (1989). Because a blood draw 
involves an intrusion on the integrity of the body, fourth 
amendment principles are particularly implicated. 
The State cites no authority for the proposition that the 
exigent circumstances exception is inapplicable to blood draws or 
applies differently. Schmerber directly applied exigent 
circumstances jurisprudence to the intoxicated driver fact pattern, 
noting: 
8Likewise, in addressing the authority of officers in Utah to 
obtain telephonic warrants, this Court must address § 77-23-204(2) , 
rather than the federal analogue contained in Rule 41(c)(2). 
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Particularly in a case such as this, where time had to be 
taken to bring the accused to a hospital and to 
investigate the scene of the accident, there was no time 
to seek out a magistrate and secure a warrant. 
Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 770-1. Had there been time to obtain a 
warrant, exigent circumstances would not have been present and the 
result in Schmerber, under identical reasoning, would have been 
different. 
With the advent of cellular phones and wireless 
technology, it is now considerably easier to obtain telephonic 
access to magistrates than when Schmerber was decided. Utah Code 
Ann. § 77-23-204(2) and Rule 41(c)(2), Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure, are both recognitions of this fact of modern existence. 
As a result, now there is time to obtain a telephonic warrant in 
many cases where, in 1966, such a warrant was unobtainable. The 
reasoning of Schmerber still applies, but the underlying facts are 
different in that magistrates are now easily accessible by phone. 
The fourth amendment principles explicated by the 
authority cited by appellant are sound. Cuaron, being a Tenth 
Circuit decision, is controlling authority as to the scope and 
meaning of the fourth amendment in this jurisdiction. This Court 
may not ignore this controlling authority and follow the cases 
cited by the State, which are only persuasive but not controlling. 
B. IT DID NOT TAKE OVER TWO HOURS TO OBTAIN 
A WARRANT IN LOPEZ. 
The State argues that appellant's assertion that a 
telephonic warrant may be obtained in 24 minutes is a misreading of 
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State v. Lopez, 676 P.2d 393 (Utah 1984), asserting instead that it 
in fact took over two hours to obtain a warrant in that case. To 
the contrary, the opinion states, "In this case, the record shows 
that it took 24 minutes to obtain this warrant by telephone in 
compliance with all of the statutory formalities." Lopez 676 P. 2d 
at 397. The only statutory formality required prior to the actual 
phone call would be preparation of the duplicate original warrant, 
so that the magistrate can have the officer "read to him verbatim 
the contents of the warrant." While this may take a couple of 
minutes, it certainly would not take an hour and forty minutes as 
implied by the State. The warrant only needs a court caption, a 
statement ordering a peace officer to search or seize specified 
persons or places, and a signature line indicating the officer is 
signing for the magistrate pursuant to telephonic authority. In 
the intoxicated driver context, officers could have preprinted 
forms where only the defendant's name and the name of the 
magistrate needs to be inserted. This would take mere seconds. A 
telephonic warrant is easily obtainable in under thirty minutes. 
POINT III. APPELLANT HAS NOT WAIVED HIS § 77-17-13 
CLAIM. 
(Replying to State's brief at Point III, pp. 44-49) 
The State asserts that Mr. Bredehoft waived his § 77-17-
13 claim with respect to Dr. Middleton, contending that the trial 
objection at R. 1244-1251 was not sufficiently specific. In light 
of all § 77-17-13 objections made during the course of the trial, 
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defense counsel's renewed objection during the testimony of Dr. 
Middleton fully preserved the issue. 
Counsel first raised a § 77-17-13 objection on August 29, 
1994, one day prior to the commencement of trial, concerning the 
testimony of Trooper Zdunich, although the statute was not 
specified by cite: 
MR. MICKELSON: My concern is the 10 to 12 
days, four new witnesses have been identified on behalf 
of the State. One just today as an expert which we need 
to talk about too. That's my concern, we might not 
finish on Friday. I'm getting more and more concerned 
about that part. 
R. 501. 
MR. MICKELSON: The only other matter I'm 
concerned about, so it doesn't tie us up in the afternoon 
or mid-day, I was informed that the State intended to 
call an additional expert witness, an Officer Deevenish[9] 
from the Utah Highway Patrol regarding the -- I guess 
effect of alcohol on people. This is the first notice I 
have had of that witness. I believe it is not in 
compliance with the statutory section regarding notice of 
experts, et cetera. There's been no written statement as 
to what he is going to testify to. And I believe we 
better air that issue now before we go any further, how 
we handle that. 
THE COURT: Ms. Hornak or Mr. Ybarra? 
MR. YBARRA: Yes, your Honor. In preparation 
on Friday it came to our attention that it would be 
helpful to have an expert witness who can educate the 
jury with regard to the effects of alcohol. And we 
didn't have any such witness already identified. 
And at that time we contacted Trooper 
Deevenish, who is a state expert, Utah Highway Patrol, 
who has received extensive training with regard to the 
effect of alcohol. He already happens to be the person 
who calibrates intoxilizers, many intoxilizers throughout 
the Valley. If I'm not mistaken, I believe Mr. Mickelson 
is familiar with Trooper Deevenish, having been 
9Though not clear from the transcript, it appears from later 
argument that the trooper at issue is Trooper Zdunich. See R. 
1092. 
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practicing in many DUIs. So I believe he may be 
generally familiar. 
We anticipated Mr. Mickelson coming over. We 
were going to discuss that with him. Unfortunately, that 
didn't work out, so this morning -- we notified him 
today. We notified him that it was our intent. I 
discussed with him the nature of that testimony. Trooper 
Deevenish has no personal knowledge of any of the facts 
of this case. His only education to the jury is as to 
the effect of that case. 
THE COURT: There's no question that you did 
not comply with the statute[10] notification of opposing 
counsel in writing regarding the name of the witness and 
the nature of the testimony. 
MR. YBARRA: That's true. It only came to our 
attention Friday as we were preparing our case in the 
final form. 
THE COURT: When do you intend to use the 
trooper? 
MR. YBARRA: He will be one of our later 
witnesses. The earliest would be Wednesday afternoon. 
THE COURT: May I ask you to do this, then: 
Sometime before 9:00 tomorrow to comply with the statute, 
to give Mr. Mickelson a proffer of the scope of the 
testimony? 
MR. YBARRA: Yes, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Then I will reserve ruling on this 
until I can then hear from Mr. Mickelson regarding any 
prejudice that can be gained by the use of this late 
designated[11] witness. 
MR. YBARRA: Yes, your Honor, we will be glad 
do that. 
R. 524-6 
10At this point, § 77-17-13 has not been mentioned by name, yet 
the trial court's question indicates that the court is well 
familiar with the statute. 
l:LThe trial court is thus the first to use any form of 
"designate" with respect to expert witnesses. The State's 
suggestion that defense counsel's objections had to do with the 
State's "failure to 'designate' Dr. Middleton as an expert," 
State's brief at 48, is entirely correct. Section 77-17-13 
controls the disclosure of experts. No other statute discusses 
designation of experts except § 77-14-3, concerning expert 
testimony as to the mental state of a defendant, clearly not at 
issue here. 
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During the third day of trial on September 1, 1994, the 
issue was again raised, primarily with respect to Trooper Zdunich, 
but also with respect to Dr. Middleton, and the statute was 
specifically identified: 
THE COURT: The record will reflect we remain 
outside the presence of the jury. The purpose of this 
out-of-jury presence is to discuss whether or not --
discuss the objections that Mr. Mickelson has made on 
behalf of the defendant regarding the testimony of 
Zabriskie. 
MR. MICKELSON: Zdunich. 
THE COURT: Prospective witness Zdunich. As I 
recall, his objection was timely lodged at the beginning 
of the trial regarding lack of notice as to the use of 
the expert witness by the State. I advised the State at 
that time to comply with the statute and to naming and 
writing the witness and a brief description of contents 
of its testimony. Whether or not that has been complied 
with, I don't know. 
Mr. Mickelson brought up in chambers an 
objection which is ongoing as to the, number one, the use 
of that witness and question if he is to be used, the 
scope of his testimony, is that correct, Mr. Mickelson? 
MR. MICKELSON: Yes, your Honor. As the Court 
is aware, I first noted the State was going to use 
Trooper Gary Zdunich Monday morning at, oh, at 
approximately -- during a telephone call. This was later 
disclosed to the court Monday afternoon after 3:30. And 
Tuesday morning for the first time I received a Vita and 
small half-page statement as to the nature of Trooper 
Zdunich7 s testimony. 
The State has also identify they were calling 
him not as a lay witness or eyewitness but as an expert 
witness under Section 77'-17-13(a). The Rule requires 
there be disclosure not less than 30 days before trial or 
ten days before a hearing. Obviously this cannot occur 
in this case. 
And further, under that section - - i t goes on 
under Section 3 as to what should occur should the 
prosecution fail to meet the requirements of this 
section. It goes on to state: The opposition party 
shall be, (a) entitled to a continuance of the trial or 
hearing sufficient to allow preparation to meet the 
testimony. If the court finds that the failure to comply 
with this section was a result of bad faith on the part 
of any party or attorney, the court shall impose 
appropriate sanctions. 
THE COURT: Reference again that statute. 
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MR. MICKELSON: Excuse me? 
THE COURT: Reference again the statute. Give 
the cite. 
MR. MICKELSON: 77-17-13(3). I was just 
reading. 
THE COURT: 77-17 sub 13. Okay. 
MR. MICKELSON: Since Monday we have attempted 
to locate an expert to meet --to counter or respond to 
the anticipated testimony of Officer Zdunich. As the 
prosecution is well aware, those types of experts don't 
exist in the State of Utah. These experts are troopers, 
et cetera. Retired troopers, et cetera. As a result of 
that we have been effectively precluded by this late 
notice of even having an opportunity or chance to get an 
expert in here to respond to the testimony of Officer 
Zdunich. We believe there ou [gh]t to be sanctions in the 
case, although I can't say it's in bad faith by the 
prosecution -- he's got to give 30 days in advance. 
Mr. Ybarra knows the difficulty of such ways 
and has given us less than a day's notice before trial. 
And we move the Court for the exclusion of that witness. 
R. 1092-94 (emphasis added). 
MR. YBARRA: We 11, your Honor, we don' t 
anticipate -- I believe it is a Dr. Ray Middleton, is 
that correct, who is a medical doctor who lectures, I 
believe itfs LPS Davspring, with regard to those issues 
of the effect of alcohol. Our intent was to show that 
the defendant had been exposed to this information, and 
it may be that we could, during our examination of him, 
bring out exactly what he told the defendant in that 
regard. However, it is not —it wouldn't necessarily be 
offered for the proof of those issues. 
THE COURT: But the basis for me allowing you 
to have someone testify as to what information may have 
been given to the defendant was to allow you to use that 
to support the proposition that he was aware of the 
effects of alcohol upon someone and how that is 
correlated with driving; correct? 
MR. YBARRA: Yes. And in that regard, your 
Honor, I believe Dr. Middleton could testify in some 
general sense. J don't know that he's done the 
intoxications that Trooper Zdunich has done and is aware 
of specifically with regard to someone in a BA .27. He' s 
had experience with that. That's why it is different. 
THE COURT: And I understand that regardless, 
pursuant to my previous rulings, your Dr. Middleton would 
be testifying as to what he presented in a class or 
classes in which the defendant was present. 
MR. YBARRA: That's correct. 
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THE COURT: Anything more, Mr. Mickelson? 
MR. MICKELSON: Yes. . . . 
And in regard to Dr. Middleton, this is the 
problem we have been having in this case. I have here a 
copy of the State's witness list which was presented and 
since that time the State has added Dr. Middleton. They 
have added Officer Zdunich after the 10th of August. 
Just prior to that one, I received another one which 
didn't even have Dr. Lund or Melanie Hansen. This is in 
the last ten days I get four new witnesses to deal with. 
Now they identified Dr. Middleton, as you 
correctly recalled it, that he's coming in for the sole 
purpose/ on the element of criminal negligence, to 
testify to what their program at Davsvring Hospital 
educated Mr. Bredehoft on, and that's not as an expert. 
Now he'd suffer from the same vroblems if he was now 
allowed to take and testify as an expert witness on the 
issue of the effects of intoxication on a person. 
THE COURT: Tell me how the prejudice --by the 
fact that you have now received Zdunich's CV, as well as 
a brief description of his testimony -- how you are 
prejudiced. 
MR. MICKELSON: Your Honor, it's our belief 
that the effects of alcohol affect different people 
differently, depending on what they have eaten, their own 
characteristics, their own metabolism, et cetera. And 
given the opportunity to respond to this would allow us 
to bring our own witness in so that if their witness got 
on the stand, say [.]2[]7, they should be falling around, 
stumbling around, we would have an expert that says it 
depends. It depends on the person, this, this and that. 
1098-1101 (emphasis added). 
THE COURT: As I read the statute, if you 
request, we could continue this matter until you have had 
time to get that. Or if I find that it is in bad faith, 
I can take appropriate sanction. The wording of this 
statute is inartfully done as far as I'm concerned. It 
doesn't give me remedies, if I find no bad faith that 
what to do is prejudice. It does say, "You shall be 
entitled to a continuance" if this matter is -- the 
statute is not complied with and that is mandatory. It 
says "shall." 
Now procedurally and practically what are we 
going to do? We are four days in this trial. 
Mr. Ybarra? 
1103. 
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THE COURT: I'm making the finding there was 
bad faith on the part of the State. So my question to 
you: Are you making a motion to continue this trial? 
MR. MICKELSON: That would be our only other 
motion. 
R. 1107. 
THE COURT: And you're reading the statute 
correctly. Whether you're hearing me correctly or not, 
I'm reading what the statute says. If the statute is not 
complied with, and you wish to bring in that evidence, 
then he is entitled --he shall be, not may. He shall be 
entitled to a continuance, if you want to use that 
evidence. If I find bad faith, then I can take 
appropriate actions. 
R. 1108-9. 
THE COURT: I am going to take this under 
advisement. We will proceed with testimony, other than 
Trooper Zdunich, to complete as much as possible of the 
case, absent his testimony, at lest until today. Have 
Ms. Hornak and Mr. Ybarra talk over the lunch hour, maybe 
a possibility would be to make the availability of 
Zdunich prior to his testimony to Mr. Mickelson so that 
he can know exactly what he is going to testify about, 
and then he can have an expert as to those specific 
grounds. And I say that's just a possibility. 
MR. YBARRA: We would be glad to do that. 
THE COURT: I'm jammed up on this question. 
I'm jammed up on this question. I don't want to continue 
it. However, you didn't comply with the statute. The 
statute says this is what happened and it didn't say may. 
If it said may, then that's discretionary. It says 
shall. That's mandatory. He is requesting a 
continuance. 
R. 1110-1111. Just prior to the lunch recess, for a total of 
twenty transcript pages (R. 1092-1112), the attorneys and the court 
discussed § 77-17-13 issues with respect to the testimony of 
Trooper Zdunich and Dr. Middleton. 
After lunch, Trooper Jeff Peterson, crime lab analyst 
Bruce Beck, and blood draw technician Brian Davis testified for 
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approximately 120 transcript pages (R. 1113-1235). Dr. Middleton 
testified next, R. 1235-1252, finishing out the afternoon's 
testimony. Defense counsel repeatedly renewed his objection to 
allowing Dr. Middleton to testify as an expert: 
MR. MICKELSON: Objection, your Honor, again 
rule on expert witnesses. 
R. 1245. 
MR. MICKELSON: Thank you, your Honor. Again 
I renew my objection, again, under the rules on expert 
witnesses, and I believe they have crossed the line on 
that area, would ask the Court to follow the statute on 
expert witnesses at this point. 
THE COURT: I understand. Thank you. And as 
I understand the proffered testimony, it's asking this 
witness's opinion regarding the effects of a BA of .27 
upon an individual based upon his training in the area 
and experience and expertise. Is that correct, Mr. --
MR. YBARRA: That is correct. 
THE COURT: -- Ybarra? Thank you. 
MR. MICKELSON: Your Honor, as I understand 
that calls for an expert opinion at this point in time, 
again the State --
R. 1246-7. 
MR. MICKELSON: I understand that, your Honor, and 
I accept that part of it. At this point in time they are 
moving over into the expert opinion area with this witness and 
he was not designated as an expert witness to testify on the 
effects of --
THE COURT: Your objection is noted. 
R. 1247. 
MR. MICKELSON: Again, your Honor, objection as 
to --
THE COURT: Qualified expert witnesses? 
Thank you for objecting. . . . 
R. 1248. 
MR. MICKELSON: Your Honor, let me make this a 
continuing objection at this point again. I have no 
problem with what he instructed people at various times 
in 1987. But as to opinions, as to persons with a 
certain level of alcohol in their system, I'm going to 
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make that continuing objection. Any questions along that 
line requires his opinion, then I will --my objection is 
-- before I make a continuing objection on the failure to 
follow the statute on expert witnesses. 
R. 1249. 
After 20 transcript pages of discussion of § 77-17-13 
prior to lunch that same day, during which time the trial court 
read the statute at least once and probably several times, there 
can be no question that the trial court understood defense 
counsel's objection and the legal basis for it. To suggest 
otherwise is an insult to Judge Iwasaki's intelligence. This issue 
is fully preserved. 
* * * 
Mr. Bredehoft relies on his opening brief in response to 
those portions of the State's brief not directly addressed here. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing and his opening brief, Mr. 
Bredehoft respectfully requests that his conviction be reversed. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this W day of January, 1998. 
y . / I./ • ! 
/ S&W-
ROBERT K. HEINEMAN 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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ADDENDUM A 
Statutes, Rules, and Constitutional Provisions 
The fourth amendment to the federal constitution 
provides: 
[Unreasonable searches and seizures.] 
The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable 
cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or 
things to be seized. 
The sixth amendment to the United States Constitution 
provides: 
[Rights of accused.] 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall 
enjoy the right to a speedy trial, by an impartial jury 
of the State and district wherein the crime shall have 
been committed, which district shall have been previously 
ascertained by law, and to be confronted with the 
witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for 
obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the 
Assistance of counsel for his defence. 
Article I, section 12 of the Utah Constitution provides: 
Sec. 12. [Rights of accused persons.] 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have 
the right to appear and defend in person and by counsel, 
to demand the nature and cause of the accusation against 
him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his own 
behalf, to be confronted by the witnesses against him, to 
have compulsory process to compel the attendance of 
witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy public 
trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in 
which the offense is alleged to have been committed, and 
the right to appeal in all cases. In no instance shall 
any accused person, before final judgment, be compelled 
to advance money or fees to secure the rights herein 
guaranteed. The accused shall not be compelled to give 
evidence against himself; a wife shall not be compelled 
to testify against her husband, nor a husband against his 
wife, nor shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for 
the same offense. 
Where the defendant is otherwise entitled to a 
preliminary examination, the function of that examination 
is limited to determining whether probable cause exists 
unless otherwise provided by statute. Nothing in this 
constitution shall preclude the use of reliable hearsay 
evidence as defined by statute or rule in whole or in 
part at any preliminary examination to determine probable 
cause or at any pretrial proceeding with respect to 
release of the defendant if appropriate discovery is 
allowed as defined by statute or rule. 
Article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution provides: 
Sec, 14 • [Unreasonable searches forbidden -- Issuance 
of warrant.] 
The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable 
searches and seizures shall not be violated; and no 
warrant shall issue but upon probable cause supported by 
oath or affirmation, particularly describing the place to 
be searched, and the person or thing to be seized. 
Utah Code Ann. § 32A-12-103 (1994) provides: 
32A-12-103. Criminal responsibility for conduct of 
another 
In addition to Title 76, Chapter 2, Part 2, of the 
Utah Criminal Code relating to criminal responsibility 
for the conduct of another, the following principles 
apply to violations of this title: 
(1) If a violation of this title is committed by any 
person in the employ of the occupant of any premises in 
which the offense is committed, or by any person who is 
required by the occupant to be or remain in or upon the 
premises, or to act in any way for the occupant, the 
occupant is prima facie considered a party to the offense 
committed, and is liable as a principal offender, 
notwithstanding the fact that the offense was committed 
by a person who is not proved to have committed it under 
or by the direction of the occupant. Nothing in this 
section relieves the person actually committing the 
offense from liability. 
(2) If a violation of this title is committed by a 
corporation or association, the officer or agent of the 
corporation or association in charge of the premises in 
which the offense is committed is prima facie considered 
a party to the offense committed, and is personally 
liable to the penalties prescribed for the offense as a 
principal offender. Nothing in this section relieves 
the corporation or association or the person who actually 
mmitted the offense from liability. 
Emphasis added. 
Utah Code Ann. § 32A-12-204 (1994) provides: 
32A-12-204. Unlawful sale or supply to intoxicated 
persons 
A person may not sell, offer to sell, or otherwise 
furnish or supply any alcoholic beverage or product to 
any person who is apparently under the influence of 
intoxicating alcoholic beverages or products or drugs or 
to a person whom the person furnishing the alcoholic 
beverage knew or should have known from the circumstances 
was under the influence of intoxicating alcoholic 
beverages or products or drugs. 
Utah Code Ann. § 32A-14-101 (1994)12 provided: 
32A-14-101. Liability for injuries resulting from 
distribution of alcoholic beverages--Causes of 
action--Statute of limitations--Employee 
protections 
(1) Any person who directly gives, sells, or 
otherwise provides liquor, or at a location allowing 
consumption on the premises, any alcoholic beverage, to 
the following persons, and by those actions causes the 
intoxication of that person, is liable for injuries in 
person, property, or means of support to any third 
person, or to the spouse, child, or parent of that third 
person, resulting from the intoxication: 
(a) any person under the age of 21 years; 
(b) any person who is apparently under the 
influence of intoxicating alcoholic beverages or 
products or drugs; 
(c) any person whom the person furnishing the 
alcoholic beverage knew or should have known from 
the circumstances was under the influence of 
intoxicating alcoholic beverages or products or 
drugs; or 
(d) any person who is a known interdicted 
person. 
(2) An employer is liable for the actions of its 
employees in violation of this chapter. 
12The 1996 amendment, effective July 1, 1997, only corrects the 
statutory cite to the Utah Antidiscriminatory Act, and effects no 
substantive change. 
(3) A person who suffers an injury under Subsection 
(1) has a cause of action against the person who provided 
the alcoholic beverage in violation of Subsection (1). 
(4) If a person having rights or liabilities under 
this chapter dies, the rights or liabilities provided by 
this chapter survive to or against that person's estate. 
(5) The total amount of damages that may be awarded 
to any person pursuant to a cause of action under this 
chapter that arises after July 1, 1985 is limited to 
$100,000 and the aggregate amount which may be awarded to 
all persons injured as a result of one occurrence is 
limited to $300,000. 
(6) An action based upon a cause of action under 
this chapter shall be commenced within two years after 
the date of the injury. 
(7) Nothing in this chapter precludes any cause of 
action or additional recovery against the person causing 
the injury. 
(8) (a) A sanction or termination of employment 
may not be imposed upon any employee of any 
restaurant, airport lounge, private club, 
on-premise beer retailer, or any other 
establishment serving alcoholic beverages as a 
result of the employee having exercised the 
employee's independent judgment to refuse to sell 
alcoholic beverages to any person the employee 
considers to meet one or more of the conditions 
described in Subsection (1). 
(b) Any employer who terminates an employee or 
imposes sanctions on the employee contrary to this 
section is considered to have discriminated against 
that employee and is subject to the conditions and 
penalties set forth in Title 34, Chapter 35, the 
Utah Antidiscriminatory Act. 
Emphasis added. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-17-13 (1995) provides: 
77-17-13. Expert testimony generally--Notice 
requirements. 
(1) (a) If the prosecution or the defense intends to 
call any expert to testify in a felony case at trial or 
any hearing, excluding a preliminary hearing, the party 
intending to call the expert shall give notice to the 
opposing party as soon as practicable but not less than 
3 0 days before trial or ten days before the hearing. 
Notice shall include the name and address of the expert, 
the expert's curriculum vitae, and a copy of the expert's 
report. 
(b) The expert shall prepare a written report 
relating to the proposed testimony. If the expert has 
not prepared a report or the report does not adequately 
inform concerning the substance of the expert's proposed 
testimony including any opinion and the bases and reasons 
of that opinion, the party intending to call the expert 
shall provide to the opposing party a written explanation 
of the expert's anticipated testimony sufficient to give 
the opposing party adequate notice to prepare to meet the 
testimony, followed by a copy of any report prepared by 
the expert when available. 
(2) As soon as practicable after receipt of the 
expert's report, the party receiving notice shall provide 
notice to the other party of witnesses whom the party 
anticipates calling to rebut the expert's testimony, 
including the name and address of any expert witness and 
the expert's curriculum vitae. If available, a report 
of any rebuttal expert shall be provided. If the 
rebuttal expert has not prepared a report or the report 
does not adequately inform concerning the substance of 
the expert's proposed testimony, or in the event the 
rebuttal witness is not an expert, the party intending to 
call the rebuttal witness shall provide a written 
explanation of the witness's anticipated rebuttal 
testimony sufficient to give the opposing party adequate 
notice to prepare to meet the testimony, followed by a 
copy of any report prepared by any rebuttal expert when 
available. 
(3) If the defendant or the prosecution fails to 
meet the requirements of this section, the opposing party 
shall be entitled to a continuance of the trial or 
hearing sufficient to allow preparation to meet the 
testimony. If the court finds that the failure to 
comply with this section is the result of bad faith on 
the part of any party or attorney, the court shall impose 
appropriate sanctions. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-23-204(2) (1995) provides: 
(2) When the circumstances make it reasonable to do 
so in the absence of an affidavit, a search warrant may 
be issued upon sworn oral testimony of a person who is 
not in the physical presence of the magistrate, provided 
the magistrate is satisfied that probable cause exists 
for the issuance of the warrant. The sworn oral 
testimony may be communicated to the magistrate by 
telephone or other appropriate means and shall be 
recorded and transcribed. After transcription, the 
statement shall be certified by the magistrate and filed 
with the court. This statement shall be deemed to be an 
affidavit for purposes of this section. 
Rule 702, Utah Rules of Evidence, provides: 
If scientific, technical, or other specialized 
knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the 
evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness 
qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, 
training, or education, may testify thereto in the form 
of an opinion or otherwise. 
Rule 41(c)(2), Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 
provides: 
(2) Warrant Upon Oral Testimony. 
(A) General Rule. If the circumstances make it 
reasonable to dispense, in whole or in part, with a 
written affidavit, a Federal magistrate judge may issue 
a warrant based upon sworn testimony communicated by 
telephone or other appropriate means, including facsimile 
transmission. 
(B) Application. The person who is requesting 
the warrant shall prepare a document to be known as a 
duplicate original warrant and shall read such duplicate 
original warrant, verbatim, the Federal magistrate judge. 
The Federal magistrate judge shall enter, verbatim, what 
is so read to such Federal magistrate judge on a document 
to be known as the original warrant. The Federal 
magistrate judge may direct that the warrant be modified. 
(C) Issuance. If the Federal magistrate judge 
is satisfied that the circumstances are such as to make 
it reasonable to dispense with a written affidavit and 
that the grounds for the application exist or that there 
is probable cause to believe that they exist, the Federal 
magistrate judge shall order the issuance of a warrant by 
directing the person requesting the warrant to sign the 
Federal magistrate judge's name on the duplicate original 
warrant. The Federal magistrate judge shall immediately 
sign the original warrant and enter on the face of the 
original warrant the exact time when the warrant was 
ordered to be issued. The finding of probable cause for 
a warrant upon oral testimony may be based on the same 
kind of evidence as is sufficient for a warrant upon 
affidavit. 
(D) Recording and Certification of Testimony. 
When a caller informs the Federal magistrate judge that 
the purpose of the call is to request a warrant, the 
Federal magistrate judge shall immediately place under 
oath each person whose testimony forms a basis of the 
application and each person applying for that warrant. 
If a voice recording device is available, the Federal 
magistrate judge shall record by a means of such device 
all of the call after the caller informs the Federal 
magistrate judge that the purpose of the call is to 
request a warrant. Otherwise a stenographic or longhand 
verbatim record shall be made. If a voice recording 
device is used or a stenographic record made, the Federal 
magistrate judge shall have the record transcribed, shall 
certify the accuracy of the transcription, and shall file 
a copy of the original record and the transcription with 
the court. If a longhand verbatim record is made, the 
Federal magistrate judge shall file a signed copy with 
the court. 
(E) Contents. The contents of a warrant upon 
oral testimony shall be the same as the contents of a 
warrant upon affidavit. 
(F) Additional Rule for Execution. The person 
who executes the warrant shall enter the exact time of 
execution on the face of the duplicate original warrant. 
(G) Motion to Suppress Precluded. Absent a 
finding of bad faith, evidence obtained pursuant to a 
warrant issued under this paragraph is not subject to a 
motion to suppress on the ground that the circumstances 
were not such as to make it reasonable to dispense with 
a written affidavit. 
